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Our results show that over the two cycles that characterize the 2003-2016 period a 
significant change in the working of oil markets occurs. Our pricing investigation, 
based on a three-agent model (hedgers, fundamentalist speculators and chartists), 
find that from 2009 onwards traditional analysis of supply and demand forecasts, 
loses its explanatory power and hence its credibility. The sharp and unexpected 
fluctuations in oil prices, compounded by unpredictable political factors and 
technological break-troughs (e.g. tight sands/shale oil) strongly raises uncertainty 
and reduces the effectiveness of customary forecasting techniques.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Between 2003 and 2016, oil prices witness unprecedented fluctuations that result in 
two major cycles, which straddle the 2009 global financial freeze. The first cycle 
begins in 2003, when prices – starting from a persistent low level (about 30 dollars 
per barrel on average) – increase continuously, driven by US economic expansion 
compounded by the rapid growth of demand from emerging market countries 
(especially India and China). The decline, which begins in mid-2006, due to mild 
weather conditions, heavy selling by financial funds and the first decline in twenty 
years of oil demand by OECD countries, is brought to abrupt halt, in the subsequent 
two years, by an extremely rapid and unexpected upswing variously attributed to 
portfolio considerations and/or to financial speculation.1 This first cycle thus appears 
to be determined mostly by demand considerations in the context of growing 
financialization of commodity/oil markets, characterized by increasing involvement of 
financial agents (institutional investors, hedge funds, and ETFs). The second factor 
becomes more relevant in the final part of the cycle. 
With the world economy plunged in the Great Recession and with major technological 
innovations (shale oil in particular) and geopolitical turmoil (Middle-East conflicts, 
Saudi Arabia energy policy shifts) affecting the global oil industry, a proper 
identification of oil price drivers, during the second cycle (2008 – 2016), becomes 
more difficult. Indeed the market witnesses unprecedented changes in demand, 
supply and industrial factors. A rapid recovery in oil prices in 2010, due to supply 
disruptions, such as the decline of Lybian and Iranian oil output, associated with a 
recovery in demand, as the US economy exited the crisis, is followed by a period of 
                                                          
1 As to the origin of the 2008 oil/commodity prices upswing, debate is still open. Master (2008), among others, 
attributes it to financial speculation, Hamilton (2009) and Kesicki (2010) to fundamental variables (weak dollar 
combined with low elasticity of supply).  
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relatively stable and high prices. The Summer of 2014, however, witnesses a 
slowdown in demand, cyclical in nature in emerging market countries and structural 
in the major industrialized countries, due to the adoption of energy saving measures 
(see Babel and McGillicuddy 2015). This, combined with rapid growth of US shale oil 
output, brings about an unprecedented change in the oil production policies of Saudi 
Arabia and of the major OPEC countries. More precisely, Saudi Arabia, with the explicit 
objective of undercutting the booming US tight sands/shale oil industry, decided to 
abandon its policy of price stabilization, which traditionally implied that supply be 
adjusted to demand shifts.2 The resilience of the US shale oil sector, which reduced 
its production costs, regrouped, and managed to maintain its share of global oil 
production, defeated this attempt. Faced by ballooning budget deficits, Saudi Arabia 
and its OPEC partners had to resume their policy of price stabilization.3 
The growing financialization of commodity/oil markets mentioned above implies that 
a proper interpretation of oil pricing requires model structures that incorporate agents 
moved by purely financial considerations alongside traditional market players. 
Frankel and Froot (1986) underline the importance of the interaction between 
chartists (or noise traders) and fundamentalist speculators, as a driver of an 
endogenous non-linear law of motion in foreign exchange rate dynamics. In the same 
vein, a large and booming literature on commodity/oil pricing, building on path-
breaking contributions by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) and Westerhoff (2004), 
among many others, posits that agents react to differing information sets, resulting 
in market prices, which are weighted averages of their heterogeneous reactions.  
                                                          
2 Canada too witnessed a rapid growth in production from 2006 onwards driven primarily by the development of oil 
sands production. 
3 See Santabárbara (2017) and the literature quoted therein for more details on the November 2014 and December 
2015 OPEC oil supply policy decisions. On the oil supply and price stabilization policy of Saudia Arabia see Nakov and 
Nuño (2011) among others. For an alternative interpretation of the causes of the 2014 oil price slump, which 
emphasizes the role of demand factors, see Baumeister and Kilian (2015). 
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Drawing inspiration from this literature, Westerhoff and Reitz (2005), Reitz and 
Westerhoff (2007) and the classification of oil market participants set out in Tokic 
(2011), we build a model in which three categories of agents interact: noise traders, 
fundamentalist speculators and hedgers. Noise traders react to past price changes 
and can either stabilize or destabilize the market, according to whether they behave 
as contrarians (negative feedback traders) or trend followers (positive feedback 
traders). Fundamentalist speculators, among whom we include financial agents, as 
defined above respond to deviations of market returns from equilibrium. In this case, 
a destabilizing behavior is due to lack of confidence in the mean-reverting nature of 
market prices. Finally, we account for the presence of industry investors, producers 
and consumers, by including them in the category of hedgers who reduce risk by 
using futures contracts. 
Studies by Morana (2001), Vo (2009) and Silvernnoinen and Thorp (2013), among 
others, find that oil prices time series have the properties of standard financial data 
series such as fat-tails and volatility clustering. In this line, the structure of our model 
combines typical financial market behaviour with dynamic hedging of commodity 
contracts.  
As noted above, both the 2003-2009 and 2008-2016 cycles terminate abruptly, to 
the surprise of market participants. The end of the first cycle has the characteristics 
of a typical financial bubble collapse. The end of the second is related to 
diplomatic/political considerations, which were, ex ante, even less predictable for 
standard financial agents, as briefly discussed above. The paper captures the growing 
uncertainty of rational financial oil market participants (fundamentalists and 
hedgers), which raises both between the first and second sub-periods and with 
contract maturity, as they are reluctant to  operate in the market, whenever it posts 
prices that they fail to understand. Feedback traders only are left, in a highly volatile 
and erratic context. 
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This paper introduces some relevant innovations in the extant literature on oil market 
pricing to the best of our knowledge. Three categories of traders are explicitly included 
in our model: feedback traders, fundamentalists and hedgers. This greatly expands 
the dynamics of the standard behavioural speculative pricing models, which followed 
the seminal work by De Long et al. (1990), and adapts them to the pricing of futures 
contracts. We impose no a priori restrictions on the signs of the parameters of the 
futures returns relationship and stabilizing or destabilizing reactions of economic 
agents are allowed for. In the same way, no restrictions are imposed on the sign of 
the speed of adjustment coefficient in the logistic functions which model the entry in 
(exit from) the market of these agents according to their trust in the reliability of 
market pricing. By modelling both the one-month and the three-month to expiry 
futures contracts, based on weekly data, we detect a tendency to short-termism by 
rational financial agents. In periods of turmoil and rising uncertainty, they tend to 
leave the three-month futures sector and focus on the one-month contract, as they 
are wary of taking positions based on three-month ahead expectations. Feedback 
traders only are left in the market. This last finding, in particular, captures the fact 
that, especially in recent years, “new players that don’t necessarily possess the same 
depth of understanding are quickly moving in and out of the market, basing their 
trading decisions almost entirely on price momentum and volatility” 
(CommodityPoint, 2013, p.7).  
This research is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a discussion of the main 
topics that are analyzed in the paper, along with a short survey of the major aspects 
of the literature. Section 2 analyses the theoretical and empirical characteristics of 
our three-agent model and provides a primer of the implied dynamics. Section 3 sets 
forth the empirical estimates over the two sub-periods. In Section 4, we discuss and 
interpret the dynamics implied by the significance, the signs and the absolute values 
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of the coefficient estimates, taking carefully into account the historical market context 
in which oil traders had to operate. Section 5 concludes the paper.    
 
2. The model 
 
2.1 Theoretical considerations 
Hedging transactions are intended to reduce the risk of unwanted future cash price 
changes. Spot market trades are often associated with trades of the opposite sign in 
the corresponding futures market. Since current cash and futures prices are mostly 
positively correlated the financial loss in one market will be compensated by gains in 
the other market.  We define the return of cash position in the oil market as 𝑟𝑐𝑡 =
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑡 = ∆𝑐𝑡  where 𝐶𝑡 is the cash (spot) oil price. In the same way, the return of 
futures positions is 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐹𝑡 = ∆𝑓𝑡, where 𝐹𝑡 is the price of the corresponding futures 
contract. An investor who takes short (long) position of one unit in the oil cash market 
will hedge by taking a long (short) position of 𝛽 in the futures market. This hedge 
ratio can be regarded as the fraction of the short (long) position that is covered by 
futures purchases (sales). 
Prices are set in an order-driven market. Every period traders revise their long/short 
positions; price changes from t to t+1 are a function of their excess demands and can 
be parameterized by the following log-linear function 
 
𝑓𝑡+1 = 𝑓𝑡 + 𝛼(𝐷𝑡
𝐶 + 𝐷𝑡
𝐹 + 𝐷𝑡
𝐻) + 𝑒𝑡+1   (1) 
 
where α is a positive market reaction coefficient and 𝐷𝑡
𝐶 , 𝐷𝑡
𝐹 and 𝐷𝑡
𝐻 denote the demand 
of chartists (feedback traders), fundamentalists and hedgers. The residual 1te  
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accounts for additional factors that may impact on prices.  The demand of feedback 
traders at time t is given by 
 
𝐷𝑡
𝐶 = 𝑎1𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐶 (𝑓𝑡 − 𝑓𝑡−1)     (2) 
 
where coefficient 1a  is positive as feedback traders expect the existing price trend to 
persist in the subsequent time period. They will buy the commodity if ∆𝑓𝑡 is positive 
and sell it if ∆𝑓𝑡 is negative.
4 Their overall impact is nonlinear and given by 𝑎1𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐶 where 
𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐶 is assumed to measure the fraction of the set of feedback traders entering the 
market at time t. This fraction depends upon market conditions and is parameterized 
by the following logistic function  
 
𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐶 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−𝛾𝐶 (|𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖| 𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖
2⁄ )}]
−1
             𝑖 = 0,1, … , 𝑙    (3) 
 
N is the normal (equilibrium) return of oil futures contract, which is defined as the 
following n-periods moving average of current and past commodity futures returns 
𝑁 = ∑ 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑘 𝑛⁄
𝑛−1
𝑘=0 .  We assume, in this way, that oil futures returns are the algebraic 
sum of two stochastic components: an equilibrium level N and a temporary deviation 
(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖).  The value of the delay parameter i is determined empirically as it depends 
upon the physical and institutional characteristics of WTI oil pricing.  The component 
|𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖| 𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖
2     ⁄ is a signal to noise ratio. The larger the deviation of 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖 from N , the 
stronger the perception of market disequilibrium and the larger the fraction of 
feedback traders that will post orders on the market. The denominator, 𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖
2 , is an 
index of futures price variability. It accounts for the impact of risk. A higher (lower) 
                                                          
4 If a1 is negative, negative feedback traders/contrarians stabilize the market. 
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risk associated with higher (lower) price volatility will reduce (increase), for a given 
perception of market disequilibrium, the willingness of speculators to enter the 
market. The term 𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐶   can take any value in the [0;1] interval depending on the sign 
of coefficient  𝛾𝐶 as |𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖| ranges from 0 (when   𝑁 = 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖) to  . Large deviations 
of 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖 from normal value will bring about a decline (increase) in the number of 
chartists when 𝛾𝐶 is negative (positive). The absolute value of 𝛾𝐶 matters too. The 
higher the synchronization of traders’ reaction to price deviations from their normal 
level (a symptom of herding behaviour), the larger is the value of 𝛾𝐶. On the contrary, 
a low absolute value of this coefficient will reflect idiosyncratic reactions of traders to 
price disequilibria, possibly due to differing degrees of risk aversion.  
Alongside feedback traders, we posit the existence of professional (institutional) 
investors, labelled here fundamentalists, who exploit their oil market expertise for 
portfolio diversification purposes. As such, their behaviour is influenced by both 
futures and cash returns. Their demand of futures contracts at time t is given by 
 
𝐷𝑡
𝐹 = 𝑎2𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝐹(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡)     (4) 
 
Fundamentalists react to deviation of the futures return from its equilibrium value N 
as defined above. The coefficient 𝑎2 indicates how fundamentalists’ beliefs about 
market prices affect their behaviour. If the coefficient 𝑎2 takes on a positive value, 
this indicates that the majority of fundamentalists believes that the price will revert 
to its equilibrium value. This will lead them to buy if 𝑁 > 𝑟𝑓𝑡 and to sell in the opposite 
case. If the coefficient 𝑎2  takes on a negative value, fundamentalists, disbelieving in 
the mean-reverting nature of the price, will sell if 𝑁 > 𝑟𝑓𝑡 and buy in the opposite 
case.5 In all cases, we posit that fundamentalists enter or exit the market depending 
                                                          
5 See Chia et al. (2014). 
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on their perception of oil price misalignment in the spot market. Fundamentalists base 
their investment strategies on more sophisticated scenarios, which necessarily include 
the evaluation of cash oil markets and of their underlying fundamental drivers. 
Consequently, we model the transition function 𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝐹 as follows   
 
𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝐹 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−𝛾𝐹 (|𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗| 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗
2⁄ )}]
−1
         𝑗 = 0,1, … , 𝑝   (5) 
 
Where M is the normal (equilibrium) return of oil cash contracts, which is defined as 
the following m-periods moving average of of current and past cash oil returns 𝑀 =
∑ 𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑘 𝑚⁄
𝑚−1
𝑘=0 .
6  The value of the delay parameter j is determined empirically. The 
component |𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗| 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗
2     ⁄ is a signal to noise ratio, synthesizing the dynamics of 
the oil spot market. Here too, the term 𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝐹   can take any value in the [0; 1] interval 
depending on the sign of coefficient 𝛾𝐹 as |𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗| ranges from 0 (when   𝑀 = 𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗) 
to  . Large deviations of 𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗 from normal value will bring about a decline (increase) 
in the number of fundamentalists when 𝛾𝐹 is negative (positive). 
Hedgers base their decisions on the return of the hedging position and on its variance. 
As equation (6) indicates, the return to the hedging position 𝑟𝐻𝑡 is a linear combination 
of the returns of the cash and futures prices  
 
𝑟𝐻𝑡 = 𝑟𝑐𝑡 − 𝛽𝑟𝑓𝑡=(𝑐𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡−1) − 𝛽(𝑓𝑡 − 𝑓𝑡−1)  (6) 
 
Where 𝛽 is the hedging ratio. 
The variance of the portfolio revenue by unit of product is obtained: 
 
                                                          
6 In our empirical analysis it is assumed that m = n = 12. 
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𝜎𝑟𝐻𝑡
2 = 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2 + 𝛽2𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡
2 − 2𝛽𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡     (7) 
 
Where 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2  is the variance of the cash return, 𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡
2  the variance of the futures return,  
𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡 is the linear correlation coefficient between the two returns and is equal to 
(𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡⁄ 𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡). The optimum hedge ratio 𝛽
∗is derived from the first order condition 
of the hedging position variance minimization and reads as  
 
𝛽∗ =
𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡
𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡
2    (8) 
 
Therefore, the optimum hedge ratio depends on the covariance between the changes 
in futures price and cash price and on the variance of the futures price. The hedging 
model is extended by introducing a dynamic component. The performance of a 
portfolio is measured by its variance reduction with respect to the optimal percentage 
of hedging. Substituting 𝛽∗ in equation (7), we obtain  
 
𝜎𝑟𝐻𝑡
2 = 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2 −
(𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡)
2
𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡
2 = 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2 (1 − 𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡
2 )    (9) 
 
Equation (10) describes the demand of futures contracts of a trader wishing to 
minimize the variance of her optimally hedged position  
 
𝐷𝑡
𝐻 = 𝑎3𝑆ℎ𝑡
𝐻 𝜎𝑟𝐻𝑡
2     (10) 
 
An increase in the minimum portfolio variance (9) may be due to a rise in the 
variability of cash price changes and/or to a decrease in the correlation between the 
two returns. The overall impact of hedgers’ trading is nonlinear and given by 𝑎3𝑆ℎ𝑡
𝐻  
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where 𝑆ℎ𝑡
𝐻  is assumed to measure the fraction of the set of hedgers entering the 
market at time t, fraction which, in turn, will depend upon market conditions. The 
structure of the hedgers transition function is analogous to that, which governs the 
behavior of fundamentalists. Indeed both categories of agents respond to deviations 
of cash prices from their perceived equilibrium value M, even if with different speeds 
and obviously with different goals. Based on these considerations, the transition 
function 𝑆ℎ𝑡
𝐻  is parameterized by the following logistic function, whose properties 
mirror those of equation (5) 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑡
𝐻 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝛾𝐻(|𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−ℎ| 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡−ℎ
2⁄ )}]
−1
         ℎ = 0,1, … , 𝑘   (11) 
 
Substituting equations (2), (4) and (10) in equation (1) we have the following futures 
prices relationship 
𝑟𝑓𝑡+1 = 𝜃1𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐶 𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝐹(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝜃3𝑆ℎ𝑡
𝐻 (𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2 −
(𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡)
2
𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡
2 ) + 𝑒𝑓𝑡+1    (12) 
Where 𝜃1 = 𝛼𝑎1 , 𝜃2 = 𝛼𝑎2 and 𝜃3 = 𝛼𝑎3 
 
Equation (12) relates futures returns to their previous period values, to the deviation 
of these values from their long run equilibrium N, and to the past variability of the 
optimally hedged positions of oil traders and oil producers. 
Economic theory posits that spot and futures prices are jointly determined for any 
given commodity (Stein 1961). Our investigation thus includes two equations 
accounting, respectively, for the behavior of spot and futures price returns together 
with their covariance.  The conditional mean equation for 𝑟𝑐𝑡 is modelled as an error 
correction relationship (Equation 13), where spot prices adjust to futures prices, which 
11 
 
play the price discovery role.7 In the long run, indeed, a cointegration relationship 
between cash and futures prices holds and plays the role of attractor for the short-
run cash price adjustments. 
 
𝑟𝑐𝑡+1 = 𝑏0 + ∑ 𝑏1z𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑧
𝑛
𝑧=0 + ∑ 𝑏2w𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑤
𝑚
𝑤=0 + 𝜃(𝑐𝑡 − 𝜆𝑓𝑡) + 𝑒𝑐𝑡+1   (13) 
 
2.2. The empirical model 
Futures and cash price rates of return are conditionally heteroskedastic when data 
are sampled with a weekly frequency – as we do in this paper – and a GARCH 
approach is used to model the second moments that enter equation (12). Equation 
(14), the empirical counterpart of equation (13) above, parameterizes the conditional 
mean of the cash returns whereas equation (15), the counterpart of equation (12), 
illustrates futures pricing by hedgers and speculators.  
 
𝑟𝑐𝑡 = 𝑑0 + ∑ 𝑑cz𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑧
𝑛
𝑧=1 + ∑ 𝑑fw𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑤
𝑚
𝑤=1 + 𝜁(𝑓𝑡−1 − 𝜆0 − 𝜆1𝑐𝑡−1) + 𝜈𝑐𝑡   (14) 
𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝑔0 + 𝑔1𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝐶 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1 + 𝑔2𝑆𝑗𝑡−1
𝐹 (𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1) + 𝑔3𝑆ℎ𝑡−1
𝐻 ℎ𝑟𝐻𝑡−1
2 + 𝜈𝑓𝑡    (15) 
𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝐶 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−𝛾𝐶 (|𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1−𝑖| ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡−1−𝑖
2⁄ )}]
−1
  (16) 
𝑆𝑗𝑡−1
𝐹 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−𝛾𝐹 (|𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−1−𝑗| ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡−1−𝑗
2⁄ )}]
−1
 (17) 
𝑆ℎ𝑡−1
𝐻 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝛾𝐻(|𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−1−ℎ| ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡−1−ℎ
2⁄ )}]
−1
 (18) 
𝜈𝑡 = [
𝜈𝑐𝑡
𝜈𝑓𝑡
]   (19) 
𝜈𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, 𝐻𝑡)  (20) 
𝐻𝑡 = ∆𝑡𝑅∆𝑡    (21) 
𝑅 = [
1 𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑓
𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑓 1
]   (22)     ∆𝑡= [
ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡 0
0 ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡
]  (22’)  
                                                          
7 See Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010). 
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ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡
2 = 𝜔𝑐 + 𝛼𝑐𝜈𝑟𝑐𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡−1
2     (23)      ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡
2 = 𝜔𝑓 + 𝛼𝑓𝜈𝑟𝑓𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑓ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡−1
2   (23’) 
ℎ𝑟𝐻𝑡−1
2 = (ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡−1
2 −
(ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡−1𝑟𝑓𝑡−1)
2
ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡−1
2 )  (24) 
 
Our empirical model allows for a complex characterization of the interaction among 
different categories of economic agents, who react to deviations of market prices from 
their equilibrium values, in ways, which can be stabilizing or destabilizing. Table 1 
sets out a primer of the associated dynamics, focusing on the process of futures price 
determination.  
Table 1. A primer on speculative and hedging dynamics  
 Feedback traders 
𝑔1 
Fundamentalists 
𝑔2 
Hedgers 
𝑔3 
 > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 
𝛾 > 0 Positive 
feedback 
traders 
(chartists) 
enter the 
market 
Negative 
feedback 
traders 
(contrarians) 
enter the 
market 
Stabilizing 
crude oil 
investors / 
fundamentalist 
speculators 
enter the 
market 
Destabilizing 
crude oil 
investors / 
fundamentalist 
speculators 
enter the 
market 
Growing 
number of 
hedgers 
stabilize 
(destabilize) 
the market if 
cash prices 
decline (rise) 
Growing 
number of 
hedgers 
stabilize 
(destabilize) 
the market if 
cash prices 
rise (decline) 
𝛾 < 0 Positive 
feedback 
traders 
(chartists) 
exit the 
market 
Negative 
feedback 
traders 
(contrarians) 
exit the 
market 
Stabilizing 
crude oil 
investors / 
fundamentalist 
speculators 
exit the 
market 
Destabilizing 
crude oil 
investors / 
fundamentalist 
speculators 
exit the 
market 
Decreasing 
number of 
hedgers 
stabilize 
(destabilize) 
the market if 
cash prices 
decline (rise) 
Decreasing 
number of 
hedgers 
stabilize 
(destabilize)  
the market if 
cash prices 
rise (decline) 
 
The second and third column in Table 1 synthesize the behavior of feedback traders, 
taking into account both the sign of the coefficient 𝑔1 that relates the current futures 
rate of return to its past values and the heterogeneity index 𝛾. The signs of both 
coefficients have relevant implications. If 𝑔1 is positive (negative), chartists 
(contrarians) destabilize (stabilize) the market, acting as positive (negative) feedback 
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traders.8 If 𝛾 (𝛾𝐶 in equation 16) is positive (negative), the relative number of 
feedback traders, present in the market, grows (declines) with the deviation of 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1−𝑖  
from its moving average value 𝑁.  
Turning to fundamentalist speculators (see Table 1, Columns 4 and 5), the negative 
value of 𝑔2 deserves specific comment. Fundamentalists may indeed believe that the 
persistence in the misalignment between the equilibrium and the current rate of 
return on futures contracts will last for some time and persist to buy (sell) if  𝑟𝑓𝑡 >
𝑁  (𝑟𝑓𝑡 < 𝑁). This is a symptom of the failure of the price signaling process during 
periods of turbulence and is consistent with fundamentalists destabilizing the market, 
their traditional stabilizing behaviour being associated with a positive value of 𝑔2. As 
for the negative sign of 𝛾 (𝛾𝐹 in Equation 17), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain it by 
the wariness of fundamentalists to enter the market if trades based on their own 
forecasts turn out to be persistently incorrect. In this case, a growing disequilibrium 
between the cash return and its equilibrium value will bring about a decline in the 
number of fundamentalists active in the market.  
Coming to hedgers, the following considerations apply. As Cifarelli (2013, p.161) 
explains, an increase in 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2  can be produced either by an increase or a decrease in 
crude oil prices. As Equation (9) indicates the hedged portfolio variance 𝜎𝑟𝐻𝑡
2  depends 
on the variance of cash prices 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2  and on the squared correlation coefficient between 
cash and futures prices 𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡
2 . Whenever – as is the case in our estimates – correlation 
between the two prices is stable over time, hedgers will react to changes in cash 
prices only. Coefficient 𝑔3 is expected to be negative if in the previous period(s) the 
cash price rate of change is positive and positive if in the previous period(s) the cash 
price rate of change is negative. Long positions in commodities (by producers) are 
                                                          
8 The standard justification for the presence of contrarians is that some feedback traders may believe that prices 
have overshot a reasonable equilibrium value (Wan and Kao, 2009). 
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associated with short positions in futures contracts, whereas short positions in 
commodities (by e.g. traders or consumers) are associated with long positions in 
futures contracts. If the commodity cash price rises (falls), the producer is likely, in 
the subsequent time period, to increase (reduce) his planned future sales. In order to 
hedge against future spot price declines he is going to raise (decrease) his hedging 
position by selling more (less) futures contracts. The futures price will fall (rise) and 
the coefficient of the hedged position variability 𝑔3 will be negative (positive). The 
behavior of either traders or consumers causes the same sign shifts. If the commodity 
price declines (rises) traders will face, in the following period, an increase (decrease) 
in demand and increase (reduce) their short positions commitments in the cash 
market, and in order to hedge against futures price rises, will raise (cut) their long 
positions in the futures market bringing about a futures price increase (decrease).    
 
3. Empirical results 
 
The paper uses weekly data in order to measure the impact of the financial crisis on 
the dynamics of futures oil pricing, in a period, which witnessed the transition from a 
relatively smooth price behavior to accelerating growth, abruptly interrupted by 
unprecedented gyrations. Our sample spans the time interval from 2 January 2003 to 
12 January 2016 and is divided in two sub-periods, from 2 January 2003 to 30 
December 2009 and from 2 September 2008 to 12 January 2016. The partial overlap 
of the two sub-samples is due to the difficulty of attributing the consequences of the 
Lehman crisis either to the first or to the second sub-period. The oil spot price Ct is 
the WTI spot price FOB (US dollars per barrel), the futures oil price Ft is provided by 
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the EIA database.9 Figure 1 exhibits the series themselves and summary statistics of 
the rates of returns over the two sub-samples are set out in Table 2.  
 
Figure 1. Oil spot and futures prices and rates of return  
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9 Futures contract 1 expires on the third business day prior to the 25th calendar day of the month preceding the 
delivery month. If the 25th calendar day of the month is a non-business day, trading ceases on the 3rd business day 
prior to the business day preceding the 25th calendar day. Contract 3 corresponds to the second successive delivery 
month following contract 1.  
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Figure 1 depicts oil cash and futures prices in levels (left-hand panels) and in first log- 
differences (right-hand panels). Price levels provide visual insights into the puzzling 
price behaviour, which our analysis tries to explain. Leaving out the “Great 
Moderation”, our sample period is characterized by two cycles. In the first cycle, a 
persistent price increase, from 2003 to 2007, was followed by a sharp bubble-like 
spike, between 2007 and 2008. The second cycle witnesses a rise in oil prices, from 
through reached in 2009 to peak in September 2014, which ends abruptly during the 
subsequent months.10   
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 02/01/2003 – 30/12/2009 02/09/2008 – 12/01/2016 
 Spot price return 
𝑟𝑐𝑡  
Futures contract 
1 return 𝑟𝑓1𝑡 
Futures contract 
3 return 𝑟𝑓3𝑡 
Spot price return 
𝑟𝑐𝑡  
Futures contract 
1 return 𝑟𝑓1𝑡 
Futures contract 
3 return 𝑟𝑓3𝑡 
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.0027 -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0032 
Std. dev. 0.0477 0.0443 0.0396 0.0471 0.0439 0.0392 
Skewness -0.6782 -0.6725 -0.5654 -0.7263 -0.4773 -0.3897 
Kurtosis 8.2764 4.3423 4.0195 5.6423 2.2641 1.8172 
JB 485.5200 
[0.000] 
101.2127 
[0.000] 
96.8535 
[0.000] 
544.5468 
[0.000] 
96.8535 
[0.000] 
62.7217 
[0.000] 
AR1 7.2583 
[0.007] 
14.645 
[0.000] 
16.087 
[0.000] 
12.242 
[0.000] 
12.978 
[0.000] 
14.493 
[0.000] 
AR5 18.441 
[0.002] 
22.022 
[0.001] 
23.647 
[0.000] 
14.392 
[0.013] 
15.148 
[0.010] 
16.243 
[0.006] 
ARCH1 70.479 
[0.000] 
46.214 
[0.000] 
30.342 
[0.000] 
8.1652 
[0.004] 
7.1610 
[0.007] 
4.9034 
[0.027] 
ARCH5 162.37 
[0.000] 
165.57 
[0.000] 
97.429 
[0.000] 
14.974 
[0.010] 
13.635 
[0.018] 
9.8834 
[0.079] 
ADF 
(c, n) 
-10.234 
(c, 2) 
[0.000] 
-5.233 
(c, 7) 
[0.000] 
-6.961 
(c, 4) 
[0.000] 
-15.022 
(c, 0) 
[0.000] 
-5.564 
(c, 7) 
[0.000] 
-8.929 
c, 2) 
[0.000] 
BDS2       4.0244 
    [0.000]  
 
4.7491 
[0.000] 
4.0749 
[0.000] 
      7.4704 
      [0.000]  
 
6.7449 
[0.000] 
6.2902 
[0.000] 
 
Notes. Probability values in square brackets; JB: Jarque-Bera normality test; ARk: Ljung-Box test statistic for k-th 
order serial correlation of the time series; ARCHk: Ljung-Box test statistic for k-th order serial correlation of the 
squared time series; ADF(c, n): Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test statistic, with a constant term and nth order 
autoregressive component; BDSk: test statistic, with embedding dimension k, of the null that the time series, filtered 
for a first order autoregressive structure, is independently and identically distributed. 
 
                                                          
10 The dating of the breakpoint is corroborated by recursive residuals analyses of AR(1) OLS estimates of each of the 
return time series and corresponding CUSUM of squares tests. They are not reported here for the sake of parsimony 
and are available from the authors upon request.    
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As expected, the rates of return in Table 2 are strongly serially correlated and 
conditionally heteroskedastic, volatility clustering being extremely large between 
2008 and 2009 and again at the end of the sample period. They are always stationary, 
as shown by ADF test statistics, non-normally distributed and affected by 
nonlinearities. Indeed, the BDS test statistics of Brock et al. (1987) strongly reject, 
with embedding dimension 2, the null hypothesis that the rates of returns, filtered for 
first order serial dependence are iid. (Analogous results are obtained for the unfiltered 
returns, with embedding dimensions varying from 2 to 6).  
 
3.1 First period analysis  
The first sub-sample estimates (02/01/2003 – 30/12/2009) of the model can be found 
in Table 3. The parameterization of equation (15) is justified by the strategy set out 
in Teräsvirta (1994). At first, the lag of the autoregressive futures log difference is 
selected using the Akaike Information Criterion: a one-week lag provides the best fit. 
A test of linearity against the non-linear parameterization of equation (15) is 
performed following the procedure of Luukkonen at al. (1988), as modified by Wan 
and Kao (2009). The transition functions (16), (17) and (18) are replaced in equation 
(15) by a third order Taylor series approximation. The following auxiliary equation is 
estimated   
𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑟𝑓𝑡−1 + 𝜋2𝑟𝑓𝑡−1𝑦𝑡−1−𝑖 + 𝜋3𝑟𝑓𝑡−1𝑦𝑡−1−𝑖
2 + 𝜋4𝑟𝑓𝑡−1𝑦𝑡−1−𝑖
3 + 
+𝜇1(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1) + 𝜇2(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1)𝑥𝑡−1−𝑗 + 𝜇3(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1)𝑥𝑡−1−𝑗
2 + 𝜇4(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1)𝑥𝑡−1−𝑗
3 + 
+𝛿1ℎ𝑟𝐻𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿2ℎ𝑟𝐻𝑡−1
2 𝑥𝑡−1−ℎ + 𝛿3ℎ𝑟𝐻𝑡−1
2 𝑥𝑡−1−ℎ
2 + 𝛿4ℎ𝑟𝐻𝑡−1
2 𝑥𝑡−1−ℎ
3 + 𝜖𝑡  
where,     𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝑘 =  |𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−1−𝑘|,    𝑘 =  𝑗, ℎ    and   𝑦𝑡−𝑖 =  |𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1−𝑖| 
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We test linearity against STAR modeling - for various values of i, j and h  - performing 
LM tests of the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝜋2 =  𝜋3 =  𝜋4 = 𝜇2 = 𝜇3 = 𝜇4 = 𝛿2 = 𝛿3 = 𝛿4 = 0.  We 
have also tested linearity against STAR modeling for chartists, fundamentalists and 
hedgers in isolation. That is, we have performed the following LM tests of the null 
hypotheses 𝐻0𝐶: 𝜋2 =  𝜋3 =  𝜋4 = 0; 𝐻0𝐹: 𝜇2 = 𝜇3 = 𝜇4 = 0;  and 𝐻0𝐻: 𝛿2 = 𝛿3 = 𝛿4 = 0. For 
the values of the delay parameters of the first row of Tables 3 and 4, the Teräsvirta 
Non-linearity Test (TNT) statistics uniformly reject 𝐻0, 𝐻0𝐶 and 𝐻0𝐻 in the case of the 
first period estimates and fail to reject 𝐻0𝐹 only, in the second period, in the case of 
the three month futures contract. Our non-linear parameterization is thus 
convincingly  justified by the data and the time-varying fractions of chartists, 
fundamentalists and hedgers in equation (15) are parameterized using equations 
(16), (17) and (18).11 
The overall quality of fit of the model is satisfactory. The estimated parameters are 
significantly different from zero and our GARCH model captures the conditional 
heteroskedasticity of the residuals.12 The usual misspecification tests indicate that the 
standardized residuals 𝜂𝑡 are always well behaved; for each system 𝐸[𝜂𝑡] = 0,  
𝐸[𝜂𝑡
2] = 1  and 𝜂𝑡
2 is serially uncorrelated. The BDS2 tests, moreover, fail to reject the 
null that the standardized residuals are iid. The nonlinearities detected in the return 
time series of Table 2 are filtered away by the model. Surprisingly, the reaction of 
economic agents to return shifts is not homogeneous across the term-structure of the 
futures price. In the case of the more liquid one-month contract (Fut1), chartists 
behave as contrarians and enter the market, their number growing with the deviation 
                                                          
11 The Taylor procedure allows us to reject the alternative ESTAR parameterization of the transition function. For the 
sake of parsimony these tests are not reported here. It should be noticed that rejection of the 𝐻0𝐶 , 𝐻0𝐹  and 𝐻0𝐻 
hypotheses implies also the rejection of the hypotheses that chartists, fundamentalists and hedgers fail to affect the 
behaviour of the futures contracts rates of change, justifying, in this way, the three-agent model parameterization of 
our paper. 
12 The t-ratios reported in the tables are based on the robust quasi-maximum likelihood estimation procedure of 
Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). 
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of observed returns from their normal (equilibrium) value, defined as the 12-periods 
moving average of the logarithms of current and past futures prices in first 
differences.  
Table 3. First period estimates: 02/01/2003 – 30/12/2009  
Fut1  Fut3 
m = 1, n = 3 i=0, j=0, h=0  m = 1, n = 3 i=0, j=7, h=5 
𝑟𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑓𝑡  𝑟𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑓𝑡 
𝑑0 1.326     
(41.113)   
𝑔0 0.732 
           (22.454)   
 𝑑0 0.954 
(13.885)   
𝑔0 0.437 
(17.369)   
𝑑c1 0.0813     
(10.522)   
𝑔1 -0.099   
 (-11.510)   
 𝑑c1 -0.134 
(-9.298)   
𝑔1 0.209 
(14.419)   
𝑑c2 -0.001        
(-0.034)   
𝑔2  -0.228 
 (-22.096)   
 𝑑c2 -0.012 
[-0.883]   
𝑔2 -0.297 
(-4.359)   
𝑑c3 -0.036        
(-3.959)   
𝑔3 -0.639 
(-3.105) 
 𝑑c3 -0.035 
(-1.976)   
𝑔3 0.293 
(2.612)   
𝑑f1 -0.006 
 (-0.774)   
𝛾𝐶 
i = 0 
3.013 
(1.303) 
 𝑑f1 0.362 
(15.955)   
𝛾𝐶 
i = 0 
1.856 
(2.411)   
𝜁 0.887     
(27.118)   
𝛾𝐹 
j = 0 
0.953   
(4.827)   
 𝜁 0.059 
(15.933)   
𝛾𝐹 
j = 7 
-9.191 
(-2.039)   
𝜆0 0.003      
(9.544)   
𝛾𝐻 
h = 0 
-2.081   
(-1.721)   
 𝜆0 0.009 
(1.120)   
𝛾𝐻 
h = 0 
-3.387   
(-2.603)   
𝜆1 1.001  
((10929.7) 
   𝜆1 1.020 
(161.029)   
  
𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑓 
0.986 
(2594.630)    
LLF -401.498  𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑓 
0.955 
(215.150)   
LLF -1568.035 
𝜔𝑐 0.721 
(22.707)   
𝜔𝑓 0.898 
(22.91)   
 𝜔𝑐 0.619 
(7.879)   
𝜔𝑓 0.479 
(15.006)   
𝛼𝑐 0.131 
 (94.493)   
𝛼𝑓 0.1450 
(70.889)   
 𝛼𝑐 0.136 
(58.830)   
𝛼𝑓 0.102 
(28.991)   
𝛽𝑐 0.831 
(513.487)   
𝛽𝑓 0.808 
(349.957)   
 𝛽𝑐 0.832 
(352.982)   
𝛽𝑓 0.862 
(164.179)   
T.N.T. 
     
13.823 
[0.000] 
C F H 
23.754 
[0.000] 
C 
25.410 
[0.000] 
F 
15.393 
[0.000] 
      H 
 T.N.T. 
 
3.715 
[0.000] 
C F H 
6.419 
[0.000] 
C 
1.920 
[0.125] 
F 
2.771  
[0.041] 
H 
𝜂𝑐𝑡 = 𝜈𝑐𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡
2⁄          𝜂𝑓𝑡 = 𝜈𝑓𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡
2⁄  
 
  𝜂𝑐𝑡 = 𝜈𝑐𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡
2⁄   𝜂𝑓𝑡 = 𝜈𝑓𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡
2⁄  
𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡] -0.080       𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡] 
-0.077  𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡] -0.066       𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡] 
-0.061       
𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡
2 ]      1.007 𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡
2 ] 1.008  𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡
2 ] 1.028 𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡
2 ] 1.031 
Sk. -0.688       Sk. -0.588        Sk. -0.689       Sk. -0.575       
Kurt. 0.528      Kurt. 0.225       Kurt. 0.765       Kurt. 0.385       
ARCH1 0.258   
[0.612] 
ARCH1  0.574   
 [0.449] 
 ARCH1 0.853   
[0.356] 
ARCH1 0.147   
 [0.702] 
ARCH2  0.447   
[0.799] 
ARCH2 0.636  
 [0.727] 
 ARCH2 1.737   
[0.419] 
ARCH2 0.224    
[0.894] 
AR1 6.431   
[0.011] 
AR1 8.142    
[0.004] 
 AR1 0.918   
[0.338] 
AR1 1.011   
 [0.315] 
AR2 
 
6.671   
[0.036] 
AR2 
 
8.601    
[0.014] 
 AR2 3.094   
[0.213] 
AR2 3.879   
 [0.144] 
JB 33.037 
[0.000]       
JB 21.801 
[0.000]       
 JB 37.763 
[0.000]       
JB 22.397 
[0.000] 
BDS2   -0.3879 
   [0.698]  0.6981 
 
BDS2 0.0610 
[0.951] 
 BDS2 -1.0441 
[0.296] 
BDS2 -1.0708 
 [0.284] 
 
Notes. Probability values in square brackets; Sk.: Skewness; Kurt: Excess Kurtosis; JB: Jarque-Bera normality test; 
ARk: Ljung-Box test statistic for k-th order serial correlation of the time series; ARCHk: Ljung-Box test statistic for 
k-th order serial correlation of the squared time series; T.N.T.: Teräsvirta (1994) test of nonlinearity applied to the 
chartists’ (C), fundamentalists’ (F) and hedgers’ (H) transition functions and to the three transition functions 
simultaneously (C F H). BDSk: test statistic, with embedding dimension k, of the null that the standardized residuals 
are independently and identically distributed. 
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This behaviour matches that defined in column 3, row 3 of Table 1.  Fundamentalist 
speculators tend to destabilize the market, as the estimated coefficient 𝑔2 is negative, 
in increasing numbers as spot price returns deviate from their equilibrium value (see 
Table 1, column 5, row 3). Finally, the negative value of 𝑔3, combined with a negative 
𝛾𝐻 and with a rate of change of cash prices, which on average is positive, suggests 
that hedgers play a stabilizing role in the 1-month futures market, even if their 
number declines as disequilibrium grows (Table 1, column 7, row 4). This points to a 
growing lack of confidence in the ability of the market to properly price these 
contracts. 
In the case of the less liquid 3-month contract (Fut3), chartists destabilize the market, 
their number growing with the absolute value of the disequilibrium (Table 1, column 
2, row 3). Fundamentalists too destabilize the market, even if their number decreases 
as price misalignment grows (Table 1, column 5, row 4). In the case of Fut3, the 
positive sign of 𝑔3 suggests that hedgers destabilize the market, in a context where 
cash prices rising should induce producers to increase their hedging positions, with 
the effect of lowering futures prices rather than raising them as we observe. Their 
number declines as the cash returns deviate from their average values (Table 1, 
column 6, row 4). Overall, these results seem to capture the uneasiness of hedgers, 
whose presence in oil markets declines with the unprecedented price gyrations 
observed during the first sub-sample. 
 
3.2 Second period analysis 
Table 4 contains the estimates relative to the second sub-sample (02/09/2008 – 
12/01/2016), which differ significantly from the first periods estimates, a finding, 
which upholds our partition of the overall data set. Results are satisfactory, as shown 
by standard misspecification tests. Starting with the one-month contract (Fut1), both 
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chartists and fundamentalists destabilize the market, leaving it, however, for large 
deviations of futures and spot prices from their equilibrium values.  
Table 4. Second period estimates: 02/09/2008 – 12/01/2016  
Fut1  Fut3 
m = 1, n = 3 i=0, j=3, h=5  m = 1, n = 3 i=0, j=5,h=5 
𝑟𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑓𝑡  𝑟𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑓𝑡 
𝑑0 -0.902 
(-34.213) 
𝑔0 0.001      
 (0.025) 
 𝑑0 -2.778 
(-53.870) 
𝑔0 0.103      
 (2.794)   
𝑑c1 -0.076 
( -8.297) 
𝑔1 0.475    
  (25.209) 
 𝑑c1 -0.055 
(-4.391) 
𝑔1 0.231    
 (18.761)   
𝑑c2 -0.003 
(-0.269) 
𝑔2 -0.129 
(-4.107) 
 𝑑c2 -0.011 
( -0.693) 
𝑔2 -0.020   
(-1.537)   
𝑑c3 -0.025 
-3.063) 
𝑔3 0.954       
(2.082) 
 𝑑c3 -0.010 
( -1.201) 
𝑔3 -0.020   
(-0.589)   
𝑑f1 0.330     
(35.825) 
𝛾𝐶 
i = 0 
-0.152 
(-2.929) 
 𝑑f1 0.278     
(21.287) 
𝛾𝐶 
i = 0 
2.229   
(3.593)   
𝜁 0.543     
(34.340) 
𝛾𝐹 
j = 3 
-2.536 
(-2.525) 
 𝜁 0.063    
(170.945) 
𝛾𝐹 
j = 5 
6.599 
          (4.369)  
𝜆0 -0.000 
(-0.245) 
𝛾𝐻 
h = 5 
-5.365 
(-2.561) 
 𝜆0 -0.123 
-(22.911) 
𝛾𝐻 
h = 5 
2.214  
 (8.281)   
𝜆1 0.996   
(9138.965) 
   𝜆1 0.928      
(162.071) 
  
𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑓 
0.988   
(3251.962)   
LLF -1379.404  𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑓 
0.966           
(361.189) 
LLF -1556.834 
𝜔𝑐 1.010    
(41.072)   
𝜔𝑓 1.008       
 (53.938)   
 𝜔𝑐 0.774    
(17.579) 
𝜔𝑓 0.565      
  (26.971)     
𝛼𝑐 0.182   
(111.898)   
𝛼𝑓 0.154    
 (86.162)   
 𝛼𝑐 0.164     
(54.085)   
𝛼𝑓 0.124     
 (39.703)   
𝛽𝑐 0.765    
(428.090)   
𝛽𝑓 0.784    
 (470.650)   
 𝛽𝑐 0.796      
(285.621)   
𝛽𝑓 0.835      
(296.251)   
T.N.T. 4.848 
[0.000] 
C F H 
5.422 
[0.001] 
C 
2.958 
[0.032] 
F 
6.086 
[0.000] 
H 
 T.N.T. 
 
3.139 
[0.001] 
C F H 
6.681 
[0.000] 
C 
0.949 
[0.416] 
F 
2.137 
[0.095] 
H 
 𝜂𝑐𝑡 = 𝜈𝑐𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡
2⁄          𝜂𝑓𝑡 =  𝜈𝑓𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡
2⁄  
 
   𝜂𝑐𝑡 = 𝜈𝑐𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡
2⁄    𝜂𝑓𝑡 = 𝜈𝑓𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡
2⁄  
𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡] -0.087       𝐸[ηft] -0.087          𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡] -0.107 𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡] 
-0.104       
𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡
2 ] 1.001 𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡
2 ] 1.001  𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡
2 ] 1.010   𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡
2 ] 1.013 
Sk. -0.518       Sk. -0.468  Sk. -0.511       Sk. -0.520       
Kurt. 1.749 Kurt. 1.539  Kurt. 1.639       Kurt. 1.538       
ARCH1 0.262   
[0.608] 
ARCH1 0.009  
  [0.761] 
 ARCH1 0.209   
[0.647] 
ARCH1 0.003   
 [0.847] 
ARCH2 0.796   
[0.671] 
ARCH2 0.334   
 [0.846] 
 ARCH2 1.336   
[0.513] 
ARCH2 0.896   
 [0.639] 
AR1 0.248   
[0.618] 
AR1 0.001   
 [0.920] 
 AR1  0.291   
[0.590] 
AR1 0.335   
 [0.562] 
AR2 1.039   
[0.594] 
AR2 1.113    
[0.573] 
 AR2 0.872   
[0.646] 
AR2 1.397    
[0.497] 
JB 66.338 
[0.000]       
JB 52.064 
[0.000] 
 JB 59.935 
[0.000]       
JB 55.310 
[0.000]       
BDS2 -0.6295 
[0.529] 
BDS2 -0.0183 
[0.985] 
 BDS2 0.3577 
[0.720] 
BDS2 0.7274 
[0.467] 
 
Notes. Probability values in square brackets; Sk.: Skewness; Kurt: Excess Kurtosis; JB: Jarque-Bera normality test; 
ARk: Ljung-Box test statistic for k-th order serial correlation of the time series; ARCHk: Ljung-Box test statistic for 
k-th order serial correlation of the squared time series; T.N.T.: Teräsvirta (1994) test of nonlinearity applied to the 
chartists’ (C), fundamentalists’ (F) and hedgers’ (H) transition functions and to the three transition functions 
simultaneously (C F H). BDSk: test statistic, with embedding dimension k, of the null that the standardized residuals 
are independently and identically distributed. 
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Their behaviour corresponds to that described in Table 1, (column 2, row 4) and 
(column 5, row 4) respectively. The positive value of 𝑔3, combined with a negative 𝛾𝐻 
and with negative  
cash returns on average suggests that, hedgers maintain the stabilizing role they 
played in sub-period 1, even if under different cash market conditions.    
In this case too, the number of hedgers falls with market disequilibrium (Table 1, 
column 6, row 4), confirming the loss of confidence in market pricing, which results 
from the huge gyrations observed between 2008 and 2009 and the subsequent 
turmoil registered by the oil industry.  The estimates relative to the three-month 
contract (Fut3) do not contradict these findings. Positive feedback trading seems to 
be the only activity capable of attracting market transactions. Indeed, the number of 
chartists increases as returns deviate from their equilibrium value (Table 1, column 
2, row 3). Both fundamentalist speculators and hedgers, on the other hand, become 
marginally irrelevant; the coefficients relative to these two categories of agents are 
very small and, in one case, statistically insignificant. 
 
4. Stabilizing vs. destabilizing impact of chartists, fundamentalists and 
hedgers: a comprehensive view 
 
Following Cifarelli and Paladino (2011), we compute the following two “level of 
importance” ratios13 in order to assess the relative impact of hedgers versus 
speculators in determining futures market behavior: 
 
𝑅𝐶𝐹 = |
𝑤1𝜎𝑟𝑓
2
𝑤2𝜎𝑟𝑐
2 |   (25) 
                                                          
13 For a definition of this measure, see Achen (1982, p. 72-73). 
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𝑅𝐶𝐹𝐻 = |
𝑤1𝜎𝑟𝑓
2 +𝑤2𝜎𝑟𝑐
2
𝑤3𝜎𝑟𝑐
2 (1−𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑓
2 )
|   (26) 
 
Where 𝑤1 = 𝑔1𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , , 𝑤2 = 𝑔2𝑆𝑗𝑡−1
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   and 𝑤3 = 𝑔3𝑆ℎ𝑡−1
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. These coefficients quantify the 
average impact on prices of the different categories of economic agents active on the 
market, 𝑆𝑔𝑡−1
𝐶,𝐹.𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , g = i, j, h,  being the average values of the transitions functions.  
Equation (25) provides an index 𝑅𝐶𝐹 , which quantifies the relative importance of noise 
trading versus fundamentalist speculation as determinants of futures rates of change. 
It does so by taking the absolute value of the respective g-coefficients, weighted by 
the average values of the corresponding transition function and the unconditional 
variances of futures and cash rates of change respectively. In the same way, Equation 
(26) measures the relative importance of speculation as a whole (that is chartists plus 
fundamentalists) relative to hedging (𝑅𝐶𝐹𝐻). The results of this exercise can be found 
in Table 5.  
Table 5. Average impact of chartists, fundamentalists and hedgers 
 
Noise traders 
 
Fundamentalists 
 
 
Hedgers 
Noise traders 
vs. 
fundamentalists 
 
Speculators 
vs. hedgers 
 
 
𝑤1 = 𝑔1𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝑤2 = 𝑔2𝑆𝑗𝑡−1
𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 
𝑤3 = 𝑔3𝑆ℎ𝑡−1
𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
 
 
𝑅𝐶𝐹 
 
𝑅𝐶𝐹𝐻 
Fut1 
Period 1 
-0.0830 
 
-0.1514 
 
-0.0043 
 
0.4728 52.3671 
Fut3 
Period 1  
0.1603 -0.0190 0.0456 5.8147 2.0246 
Fut1 
Period 2 
0.2240 -0.0268 0.1105 7.2611 1.5335 
Fut3 
Period 2 
0.1757 -0.0178* -0.0150* 6.8373* 6.9921* 
Note. * The estimates of coefficients 𝑔2 and 𝑔3 entering these indexes are not significantly different from zero at the 
5 percent level. 
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In the first sub-period, as discussed previously, both feedback traders and hedgers 
tend to stabilize the market for 1-month futures contracts (Fut1), whereas 
fundamentalists play a relevant opposite role. The coefficient 𝑅𝐶𝐹, combined with 
these indications, points to a generally destabilizing role for speculation coming 
mainly from fundamentalist speculators, among which we include crude oil investors. 
The huge dimension of the 𝑅𝐶𝐹𝐻 index significantly reinforces the impression that 
destabilizing speculation prevails over market stabilizing forces. Similar 
considerations apply to the case of the 3-month contract (Fut3), where however the 
main destabilizing push comes from noise traders. The lower value of the speculators 
vs. hedgers ratio, observed in the case of Fut3, does not contradict these conclusions. 
Overall, these findings clearly reflect the bubble-like behavior of oil markets observed 
in the last years of the first sub-sample. 
In the second sub-period, feedback traders take the upper hand in determining 
futures rates of change, in the case of Fut1 particularly. Speculation continues to exert 
a destabilizing role, feedback trading replacing fundamentalist speculation as the 
main driver, as coefficient 𝑅𝐶𝐹 indicates. The general impact of speculation relative to 
hedging is, however, sensibly smaller with respect to what we observe in the first 
sub-sample. These findings are repeated for the 3-month contract, with the proviso 
however, that the coefficients that measure the impact of fundamentalists and 
hedgers on futures prices are not measured in a precise way. 
Comparison of the two sub-periods suggests two key considerations. The first 
consideration relates to the fact that speculation plays a destabilizing role over the 
entire sample period, its effect being however weaker in the second sub-period, as 
shown by the data reported in the last column of Table 5. The second consideration 
refers to the weakness of the stabilizing role of hedgers, who moreover tend to either 
leave the market for large deviations of cash returns from their equilibrium values or 
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have an insignificant impact as is the case for Fut3 in sub-period 2. We interpret this 
result as corroborating the main hypothesis set out in our paper, viz. the reduction in 
the informative content of fundamentals in the post-Lehman crisis period. 
Table 5 is based on the average values of the weights coefficients 𝑤1, 𝑤2 and 𝑤3. In 
Figures 2 to 5, we analyze the shifts in these coefficients as cash and futures rates of 
return deviate from their respective equilibrium values. Each graph contains a scatter 
plot of the impact of each group of agents on futures returns (regression coefficient 
multiplied by the value of the LSTAR transition function) and the deviations of the 
transition variable from its equilibrium value. We report the former on the vertical 
axis and the latter on the horizontal one. For the sake of clarity, we have interpolated 
the scatter plots using local first order polynomial regressions with bandwidth based 
on the nearest neighbor approach.14  
As for the 1-month futures contract, in the pre-Lehman sub-period, we notice that 10 
basis points deviations from equilibrium bring about a sharp increase in the stabilizing 
power of negative feedback traders (Figure 2, left panel), countered by a 
corresponding increase in the destabilizing effect of fundamentalist speculators 
(Figure 2, central panel). Hedgers, however, seem to leave the market as their 
influence on futures rates of change collapses to values close to zero (Figure 2, right 
panel).  In the case of the 3-month contract, 10 basis point deviations from 
equilibrium cause a substantial rise in the destabilizing role of chartists, which is 
compensated however by the disappearance of destabilizing fundamentalists and 
hedgers. 
 
 
                                                          
14 The local regressions are performed on a sub sample selected according to the Cleveland (1993) procedure and 
involves about 100 evaluation points. Tricube weights are used in the weighted regressions used to minimize the 
weighted sum of squared residuals. The bandwidth span of each local regression is set to 0.3. 
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Figure 2. Impact of speculators and hedgers on 1-month futures rates of return 
and deviations from long-term equilibrium (first sub-period) 
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Figure 3. Impact of speculators and hedgers on 3-month futures rates of return 
and deviations from long-term equilibrium (first sub-period) 
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Figure 4. Impact of speculators and hedgers on 1-month futures rates of return 
and deviations from long-term equilibrium (second sub-period) 
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Figure 5. Impact of speculators and hedgers on 3-month futures rates of return 
and deviations from long-term equilibrium (second sub-period) 
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The post-Lehman period provides interesting additional insight. As for the 1-month 
contract, a 10 basis points deviation from equilibrium is reflected in a moderate 
decrease in the destabilizing role of chartists, reinforced by the disappearance of 
destabilization coming from both fundamentalists and hedgers. Finally, focusing on 
the role of chartists as the only significant driver of Fut3 rates of return in the post-
Lehman period, we detect that their contribution to market destabilization increases 
with deviations from the equilibrium. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Our research addresses a controversial and hotly debated topic in commodity pricing 
viz. the effect of speculation vs. hedging in determining oil futures prices in a context 
of changing uncertainty. Our main results corroborate recent evidence by 
practitioners regarding withdrawal of rational agents (i.e. fundamentalists and 
hedgers) from oil futures markets whenever prices seem to be losing their informative 
content. Our first conclusion relates to the fact that speculation plays a clear-cut 
destabilizing role over the entire sample period, due to the joint reaction of chartists 
and fundamentalists. Of great interest is the fact that fundamentalist speculators, 
among which we include institutional investors, ETFs and Hedge funds, tend 
systematically to destabilize the market, with the exception of the three-month 
contract in the second sub-period, in which uncertainty hinders their decision taking.   
Our second conclusion refers to the weakness of the stabilizing role of hedgers, who 
moreover tend to either leave the market for large deviations of cash returns from 
their equilibrium values or have an insignificant impact as is the case of Fut3 in sub-
period 2. We interpret this result as corroborating the main hypothesis set out in our 
paper, viz. the reduction in the informative content of fundamentals in the post-
Lehman crisis period, characterized by unprecedented industrial and geopolitical 
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shocks. Our third finding is that, during the second sub-period, most economic agents 
not only concentrate on the short end of the market (Fut1), distrusting longer 
maturities, but also tend to leave it as deviations from long-term returns equilibrium 
values rises.  
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